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HAVING thus seen, from the foregoing decisions, the analogy
existing between property in pews and in market-stalls, respect-
ively, it only remains to briefly consider the nature of the property
a~juired by a holder of a lot in a church cemetery, and wherein such
lot resembles a pew in a church. The holder of a particular lot for
burial purposes, claiming under a deed or by virtue of a certificate
under seal issued to him by the corporation, where such certificate
is declared by its charter, or by the local law of the state, to be
equivalent to a deed, has an easement in the land, and not a title to
the freehold, and takes such easement subject to such changes as
the altered circumstances of the -congregation or the neighborhood
may render necessary. Washburn, in his work upon Real Property,
after speaking of pews, says: " Of the same character is the right
of burial in a public burying-ground. It is not a property in the soil
nor to compensation for the same, if, upon the ground having ceased
to be used for burial purposes, the friends of the persons buried
therein are required to remove the remains."
The question as to whether the holder of the lot possesses an
easement therein or not, depends upon whether he received a
deed therefor, or a certificate, declared by the charter or local
law as aforesaid, to be equivalent to and have the same effect
as a deed duly executed, acknowledged and recorded. In the
absence of such deed or certificate, the person making interments
in the cemetery, would do so under a mere license, and his ex
clusive right to make such interments in a particular lot would
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be limited to the time during which the ground continued to
be used for burial purposes, and upon said ground ceasing to be
used for such purposes, all that he could claim, would be, that he
should have due notice, and an opportunity to remove the bodies
and monuments to some other place of his own selection, if he
desired to remove them himself, and in default of his doing so, that
said remains should be decently removed by others. Where, how-
ever, the holder has an easement in the land belonging to the cor-
poration, his rights are, in some respects, more extended. Wash-
burn, in his work on Easements and Servitudes, says: "Rights of
burial in churchyards and pew rights in churches, although acquired
by deed of a particular lot or pew, are only easements in land
belonging to the religious society which owns the church and
churchyard. It is an easement in, not a title to a freehold, and is
to be understood as granted and taken, subject with compensation
of course, to such changes as the altered circumstances of the con-
gregation or the neighborhood may render necessary."
The case of Bryan v. Whistler, 8 B. & C. 288, will afford ap
illustration of the rights conferred by a mere license. It appeared
in that case, that the plaintiff had paid 201. to the rector of the
church for permission to erect therein, for his exclusive use, a vault,
with tablet above the same. The receipt taken by him from the
rector, said nothing with reference to the plaintiff having in exclu
sive use of the vault, which he afterwards built at his own expense,
and made an interment therein. Subsequently the rector opened
the vault and placed another body in it, whereupon the plaintiff
brought an action on the case. The defence was that the plaintiff
had no such interest in the vault as would enable him to maintain the
action, because there was no conveyance or other instrument, vesting
in him the exclusive right to the vault. The verdict being for the
plaintiff, the defendant moved for a nonsuit, and the Court of King's
Bench, upon entering a nonsuit, says as follows: "No memorandum
was in this instance signed, except the receipt. If it be not an
interest in land, it is an easement, or the grant of an incorporeal
hereditament, which could only be effectually granted by deed, and
no such instrument was executed." * * * "Case, therefore was
the proper remedy, as it is for the disturbance of a pew, the right
to which is granted for the special purpose of attending divine ser-
vice. But whether the grant were for a special purpose, or general
for all purposes, the right could not pass without deed or writing."
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In Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 841, which was a case as to
tb 3 distinction between an easement in land and a mere license to
come upon the same, the court refers to the case of 'Bryan v. Wkist-
ler, with approval, and after stating that the principle of easement
does not depend upon the quality of interest granted, but upon the
subject-matter, says, " A right of common, for instance, which is a
profit c prendre, or a right of way, which is an easement or right
in natire of an easement, can no more be granted or conveyed for
life or f-'r years, without a deed, than in fee-simple."
See also, Me Crea v. Harsh, 12 Gray 211; Burton v. Sheryf,
1 Allen 133.
In the case of Windt v. German Reformed Church, 4 Sandf.
Ch. Rep. 471, it appeared that the religious corporation became
seised of the ground, and converted it to the purposes of a cemetery.
The complainants had relatives interred therein, none of whom
had received deeds from the corporation in which the whole title
remained. After stating that the complainants could only in the
character of corporators in the society owning the ground, have any
interest in the cemetery, or exercise control over it, the vice-chan-
cellor says, "The only protection afforded to the remains of the
dead interred in a cemetery of this description, is by the public
laws prohibiting their removal except on the prescribed terms, and
in a still stronger public opinion. Probably these furnish all the
protection which is consistent with the exigencies of a large city,
the population of which increases with marvellous rapidity, and
whose wants leave but little room for the remains of the dead in
the dense and crowded haunts and thoroughfares of the living."
Returning to the subject of a permit or license to enter, he adds,
"It confers the privilege of sepulture for such body, in the mode
used and permitted by the corporation, and the right to have the
same undisturbed so long as the cemetery shall continue to be used
as such, and so long also, if its use continue, as such remains shall
require for entire decomposition, and also the right, in case the
cemetery shall be sold for secular purposes, to have such remains
removed and properly deposited in a new place of sepulture.' ie
also takes occasion to say in another part of his opinion that,
"Where vaults or burying-lots have been conveyed by religious cor-
porations, rights of property are conferred upon the purchasers,"
and refers to 3 Edwards Ch. Ri~p. 169, which was a case in which
the Brick Presbyterian Church filed a petitior for the sale of the
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church and churchyard, to which a number of pew-holders aind
vault-owners, the latter claiming under deeds, objected. The
petition was dismissed, and the vice-chancellor, after stating that
the objection of the pew-holders did not constitute an insuperable
obstacle to the granting of the application, held as follows, as to
the vault-owners: "The intention obviously was to sell and dispose
of the land, and not to grant a mere temporary use or privilege to
construct vaults in the land, with a reserve of the title to the
church. It was a grant of the land itself, such as passed the title
to the purchasers or lessees. And hence the form of the convey-
ances describing each lot or parcel by metes and bounds, with all
the apt words generally used to pass the title to land." * * *
"This view of the case renders it unnecessary to examine into the
expediency or propriety of the proposed sale and removal of the
church. If the petitioners have not the right without obtaining
the consent of the vault-holders, then it cannot be done, however
much it may be desired by a large portion of the congregation."
This case goes to the full extent of declaring that the lot-holders
claiming under deeds formally executed, took title to the fee, and
that the property could not be sold as long as they objected.
In the case of Richards v. The .iorthwest Protestant -Dutch
Uhureh, 32 Barb. 42, an injunction was applied for by the repre-
sentatives of the original grantee of a lot in the churchyard, to
restrain the officers of the church from removing remains and
destroying the vault. In denying the complainant's right to the
relief asked for, the court said: "The right of burial, it seems to
me, when confined to a churchyard, as distinguished from a sepa-
rate, independent cemetery, although conveyed with the common
formalities of ' heirs and assigns for ever,' must stand upon the same
footing as the right of public worship in a particular pew of the
consecrated edifice. It is an easement in and not a title to the
freehold, and must be understood as granted and taken, subject
(with compensation of course) to such changes as the altered cir-
cumstances'of the congregation or the neighborhood may render
necessary. * * * Like the sale of a church pew, which gives the
mere right to worship in the particular place while the church
stands and is occupied for religious purposes, the sale of a church
vault gives, it would seem, the mere right of interment in'the par-
ticular plot of ground, so long as that and the contiguous ground
oontinues to be occupied as a churchyard. The owner of the ease-
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ment may be, in case of disturbance, and no doubt is, entitled to a
reasonable compensation or equivalent; but he cannot interpose a
veto to the disposition of the soil, should the court, as was actually
the case in this instance, on application of the legitimate church
officers, deem such disposition proper and order it accordingly."
The effect of this decision is to materially modify the decision in
3 Edwards Ch.
It may be as well to state here, that it is not the purpose of this
paper to go into the subject of independent cemeteries, in which, it
would seem, whether they be joint-stock companies or corporations,
the holders of lots would possess fee-simple titles, and could exer-
cise rights of ownership and control over the same, consistent with
the purposes for which said lots were sold, in as full a manner as
over any other real property of which they might hold the absolute
title.
In the case of Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Iass. 21, it - as
held that "rights of burial under churches or in public burial-
grounds are peculiar, and are not very dissimilar to rights in pews.
They are so far public that private interests in them are subject to
the control of the public authorities having charge of public regu-
lations."
In the case of The Buffalo City Cemetery v. The City of Buffalo,
46 N. Y. 503, an effort was made by the appellant to give such a
construction to the rights acquired by its lot-holders, under the con-
veyances to them, as to make them liable, and itself exempt, from
an assessment levied by the city for the paving of a sidewalk con-
structed along the land of the said cemetery. But the court held
that the lot-holders were not liable, and used the following language
in delivering its opinion: "The effect of such conveyances, under
the statute from which the plaintiff derives its powers, is, we sup-
pose (for no copy of any conveyance is laid before us), no more than
to confer upon the holder of a lot a right to use it for the purposes
of interments. No such estate is granted as makes him an owner
in such sense as to exclude the general proprietorship of the associa-
tion. The association remains the owner in general, and holds that
relation to the public and to the government; while subject to this,
the individual has a right exclusive of any other person to bury
upon the subdivided plat assigned to him. He holds a position
analogous to that of a pew-holder in a house for public worship."
Tn the Matter of Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Penn. St. 411, the facts
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were substantially as follows: The Methodist Episcopal Church
purchased certain ground for the purpose of a graveyard, and it
was so used. In process of time it ceased to be used for interment,
and many of the bodies having been removed to other cemeteries, it
was much neglected and became a nuisance. Thereupon the legis-
lature passed an act for its vacation and sale, and for the removal
of -the bodies therefrom, and that after such removal, it should no
longer be used for burial purposes. The act also directed that the
commissioners named in the act, of whom the appellant was one,
should be authorized to purchase suitable lots in the cemeteries in
the vicinity of the city, and should remove thereto all the remain-
ing bodies, and have them decently interred; and also remove and
set up over the new graves the monuments and tombstones now
qtanding over the present graves; and that said commissioners
should also, by publication, give due notice of their intention to
act in the premises. The act further provided that the commis-
sioners, after such removal, should sell the ground to the best
advantage, and that the proceeds therefrom should be distributed,
firstly, to pay expenses of removal, including cost of the new lots;
and secondly, to compensate the lot-holders.
The bill of complaint set forth that the persons filing the same,
together with other lot-holders, were the owners of nearly all the
cemetery, having bought or inherited the same, and that whatever
title the corporation held was for their use, and that the Act of
.kAssembly under which the commissioners assumed to act, war un-
constitutional. The lower court granted a preliminary injunction,
from which this appeal was taken. In the Supreme Court of the
state, SHARSWOI, J., by whom the decree below was reversed,
referred to the certificate (which was filed in the'case as being the
one given by the church to its lot-holders respectively, and which
was under seal), and said, "The plaintiffs may be divided into two
classes: holders of certificates and holders of interment permits.
The certificate set out in the bill states that the subscriber, in con-
sideration of $10 paid by him, is entitled to 'two burying-lots in
burying-ground of said church, to have and to hold the said lots for
the use and purpose, and subject to the conditions and regulations
mentioned in the deed of trust to the trustee of said church.' This
deed of trust is not produced or annexed to the bill. We have
-printed in the appendix of the paper-book of the appellants the
.deed of Keating and wife to the Methodist Episcopal church of the
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city of Pittsburgh ; but in this deed no trustees are named. It is
a direct grant to the church; expresses no trust, not even the object
for which the ground was conveyed. The appellants admit, how-
ever, m their paper-book, that the deed to the trustees contains no
conditions or regulations on the subject. We will assume this to
be so. We cannot, however, consider the certificate as evidence of
a grant to the lot-holders of any interest or title in the soil; and if
this is so, of course not the interment permits. Had it been so
intended, it would surely have contained words of inheritance. * *
We hold that it was the grant of a mere license or privilege to make
interments in the lots described, exclusively of others, as long as
the ground should remain ' the burying-ground of the church.'
Whenever by lawful authority it should cease to be burying-ground,
his right and property would cease. The lot-holder purchased a
license, nothing more, irrevocable as long as the place continued
a burying-gound, but giving no title to the soil. Whether it was an
incorporeal hereditament descendible to him, or passed on his death
to his personal representatives, it is unnecessary to decide." After
referring with approval to the cases of Windt v. The Germcan Re-
formed Ohurch, and Bichards v. The Northwest -Protestant, ft.,
the court closed its opinion by saying: "The grant of a pew in a
church edifice creates a kind of right which appears to be ini all
respects analogous to that of a burial-lot in a graveyard. In regard
to pews there have been many more determinations than in regard
to burial-lots, and the voice of the authorities is uniform and clear."
And in upholding the constitutionality of the Act of Assembly as
to the removal of remains, he adds : "As to those recently interred,
the necessity, with a view to public health and comfort, of removing
them, is as apparent as the prohibition of future interments." * * *
"They may direct the removal in such manner and upon such
terms as to them may seem wisest and best, having due regard to
the feeling of reverence and attachment which all men naturally
have to the spot where the ashes of their departed ancestors and
friends repose, and the strong desire that, if possible, they should
not be disturbed. Even these feelings, however, must yield to the
higher consideration of the public good."
In the case of Partridge et al. v. The First Independent Ohurch
of Baltimore, 39 Md. 631, the facts were as follows: The appellee
had purchased in fee a parcel of land for a burial-ground, and it was
used for many years for that purpose. The persons from whom the
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appellants had derived the lot in question, had purchased the same
from the appellee and had acquired a certificate therefor in the form
issued to lot-holders by the appellee, which was neither sealed,
acknowledged nor recorded, but professed to convey a certain
designated lot to the party, his heirs and assigns for ever, subject to
the regulations of the church trustees. It was simply signed by
the chairman of the trustees, and attested by the register. The
purchaser had constructed an expensive vault, in which he had
interred different members of his family. The burial:ground
having ceased to be suitable for such purpose, the appellee filed a
bill against the lot-holders for a sale thereof, and trustees were
accordingly appointed to sell the same, and were directed by the
decree to see that the remains of all persons interred therein were
removed, and decently re-interred elsewhere at the cost of the church
corporation, except where parties interested desired to do so
themselves, in which case they were to bear any excess in the
cost attending such removal. The trustees faithfully performed
their duties. Months before the filing of the bill, the appellants
had removed their dead, leaving the empty vault, which the trus-
tees reserved from the sale, with the right to remove the same from
the premises. The appellee was ready and willing to pay to the
appellants the sums paid for their lot, but they claimed out of the
proceeds of the sale such sum as would enable them to construct
elsewhere a vault similar to the one they had built in the cemetery
of the appellee, and filed a petition praying the allowance of said
sum. The court having dismissed their petition, they appealed.
The only questions which arose upon the appeal were: 1st, as to
the nature and extent of the interest of the lot-holders; and, 2d,
whether, and to what extent, they were entitled to distribution of
the proceeds of sale, for and in respect to improvements placed on
the lots.
After reciting the facts, and stating that the certificate was
neither under the seal of the corporation, nor acknowledged, nor
recorded, the court, in affirming the decree, say: "We think it
clear that it conferred no title or estate in the soil, nor could it
operate as a grant of an easement, because it was not under seal,
nor was it acknowledged and recorded, so as to be effective to convey
such an interest. The right to an easement must be founded upon
a grant by deed, or upon prescription, for it is a permanent interest
in another's land, with a right of enjoyment; whereas a mere license
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is but an authority to do a particular act or series of acts, upon
another's land, without possessing any estate therein. At most,
then, the certificate, such as we have here, conferred only a privi-
lege or license to make interments in the lot described, exclusively
of others, as long as the ground remained a burying-ground or
cemetery. Whenever, therefore, by lawful authority, the ground
ceased to be a place of burial, the lot-holder's right and privilege
ceased, except for the purpose of removing the remains previously
buried." The court then refers with approval to Kincaid's Ap-
peal, 66 Penn. St. 411, and then passing to the second ques-
tion, which was to whether the lot-holder is entitled to compensation
or re-imbursement, out of the proceeds of the sale of the burying-
ground, for improvements or erections placed on the lot, says :
"We are not aware of any principle upon which this claim can
be allowed. There can be no application to this case of the princi-
ple upon which beneficial improvements are allowed for, nor is the
nature of the privilege, evidenced by the certificate, such as to
entitle the holder to any distributive proportion of the proceeds of
the sale of the estate itself. The most that the lot-holders could
claim to receive is the price paid by them for the license. If their
interest was in the estate, then they would be entitled to distribu-
tion according to that interest; but as they bad no interest in the
estate, and only an authority to do certain acts on the land, they
can claim no part of the proceeds of sale, as being the equivalent
of any interest therein. * * * All monuments and erections capa-
ble of being removed, placed on the burial-lots under a license like
the present, would be regarded as the personal property of the lot-
holder; and he would have the right to remove the same, upon the
lot ceasing to be used for the purpose of burial. * * * To the
assertion of this right the lot-holders must resort, instead of claim-
ing compensation for the cost of the erection or improvement."
In the late case ,of Craig v. First Presbyterian Cfkurch, &e., to
be reported in 88 Penn. St., the facts were, so far as it is mate-
rial to state them, substantially as follows: An Act of the Gen-
eral Assembly, passed on the 18th of April 1877, provided that
when from any cause any burial-ground belonging to or in charge
of any religious society or church, directly or through trustees there-
for, has ceased to be used for interments, the Court of Quarter Ses-
sions, upon petition of the managers, officers or trustees of such
society or church, setting forth that the erection, extension or
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improvements of buildings for religious purposes of such society (,r
church are hampered or interfered with, and the welfare of such
society or church is injured, and after notice being given and an elec-
tion held by the church members as provided in said act, may, after
full hearing, authorize and direct the removal of the remains of the
dead from so much of said burial-ground as may be needed for build-
ings for religious purposes only, by the managers, officers and trus-
tees of such society or church. The trustees of the First Presby-
terian Church petitioned the court, reciting the above act and setting
forth that the burial-ground was no longer used for interments, and
praying the passage of a decree directing them to remove the dead
from so much of the burial-ground of the church as might be required
for buildings for a Sabbath school and lecture-room. Two members
of the church appeared in court and filed exceptions upon various
grounds, which being overruled, the record was removed to the
Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari. The only question involved
in the case which it is material to here refer to is that with regard
to the right of the trustees to remove the dead. Upon this point
the court (Mr. Justice PAXSON delivering the opinion) held as fol-
lows: "The remaining question is one of power. The church hav-
ing -granted the privilege of interment in its grounds to certain
persons, it is contended that as against the corporation such persons
have a right to have the bodies remain undisturbed. In other words,
that they bad certain rights of property in said burial-ground which
could not be taken away except for public purposes, and upon mak-
ing compensation therefor; and that the Act of April 18th 1877
was transgressive of art. 1, sect. 17 of the Constitution, which pro-
hibits the legislature from passing any law impairing the obligation
of a contract." * * * "We have no accurate information as to the
precise nature of the relations between the church and those privileged
to bury in its grounds. It does not appear that any one of them had
any right to or title in the soil, nor any right of sepulture in any
particular lot or place in the yard. We have nothing in this entire
record upon this subject except the statement of Robert Dalzell.
He says in his cross-examination: 'My impression is that pew-
owners were entitled to burial without paying anything for the
ground. There .was a book which showed all orders for interments
of pew-owners and others : that book has been lost. I think that
all persons, except pew-owners, paid for the privilege of burying in
the churchyard, unless it was the poor of the church, and as to them
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I am not sure.' The most that can be made of this is that the
church granted a mere license or privilege to inter in its ground.
To pew-holders it appears to have been granted without cost-to
strangers upon a consideration. What rights does such a license
confer upon its grantee ?" The court having, in answer to this
query, referred with approval to Kincaid's Appeal, 16 P. F. Smith
420, and C-Murch v. Wells, fc., 12 Harris 249, affirmed the judg-
ment. From this decision Chief Justice AGNEw dissented, holding
that it offended against natural feeling and constitutional law, and
after admitting the right of the state in the exercise of her police
power to regulate graveyards, for the public good, and to remove,
in the exercise of eminent domain, where great public interests
require it, upon making compensation to those who have acquired
a right of sepulture by contract, he says, "In my judgment it is
equally against the constitutional inviolability of contracts. Can a
private association, corporate or unincorporate, sell a right of sep-
ulture to-day, and to-morrow or next year retake the ground for a
lecture or school-room ? It is immaterial whether a grant of sepul-
ture confers an estate or a privilege; it is a purchased right founded
in contract, which no law can violate, except for a public necessity."
It has thus been seen what is the nature of a license and of an
easement respectively, in ground used for the purposes of sepulture
and wherein the same resemble each other so far as they are both
granted subject to such changes or alterations as circumstances may
render necessary. The cardinal difference between them would
seem to be, that in the case of an easement the holder thereof is
entitled to compensation if deprived thereof by sale or otherwise,
upon the ground that he possesses a permanent interest in the
land, with a right to enjoy the same; whereas by a license no
such right is conferred, but only permission to do a certain act or
series of acts so long as the land continues to be used for the pur-
poses contemplated at the time of granting the permit.
In many of the states the estate of the owner of a burial-lot is
declared by statute to be real estate and descendible to heirs, and
devisible by will, or may be disposed of by the owner by sale, with
the approval of the corporati6n. It is also protected from attach-
ment or execution for debt, and is not affected by the insolvent laws
of the state. Freeman, in his work on Execution, says that "at
common law neither a churchyard nor the glebe of a parsonage or
vicarage, could be extended under an elegit. They were regarded
